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Extraterritoriality and Human Rights After 
Kiobel 
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†
 
 
 
Are human rights extraterritorial? In this Essay, I address the 
question from three different perspectives. In Part I, I step back to 
consider the first principles of human rights law. Whatever our 
disagreements about the implementation of human rights norms, they 
are clearly absolute prohibitions, binding both within and without the 
territory of any one state. The prohibition on genocide, for example, 
is a prohibition on committing acts defined as genocide anywhere. 
Extraterritoriality, however, is relevant to the enforcement of human 
rights norms, to determine when a state has the right or the obligation 
to impose sanctions on those who violate human rights outside the 
territory of that state. The second and third sections of this Essay 
address two aspects of the debate over the extraterritorial 
enforcement of human rights. In Part II, I discuss efforts to hold 
corporations liable for human rights violations. In Part III, I address 
the narrow issue decided by the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co.
1—the application of the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS)
2
 to cases involving some degree of extraterritoriality because 
of the location of the human rights violations, the citizenship of the 
defendants, or the plaintiffs’ lack of connections to the United States.  
I. 
The modern concept of human rights is, by definition, 
extraterritorial. Human rights today are not dependent on geography 
or government, but are rights of all human beings. The consequences 
of this broad generalization, of course, are hotly contested. But it is 
important to start with this first principle: extraterritoriality is the 
 
† Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Camden. 
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).  
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
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starting place for human rights norms in the twenty-first century. 
A. 
The concept of human rights traces back to the ancient religious 
and natural law norms that regulated the conduct of individuals and 
their treatment of others.
3
 William Blackstone recognized that history 
as underlying all of international law, which he grounded in ―maxims 
and customs . . . of higher antiquity than memory or history can 
reach‖4 and interpreted through ―the law of nature and reason.‖5 
Blackstone viewed this law as governing interactions among states 
and their citizens, not just state-to-state relations, defining the law of 
nations as regulating all intercourse between ―two or more 
independent states and the individuals belonging to each.‖6 
As positivism dominated legal theory in the nineteenth century, 
scholars narrowed the scope of international law to address state-to-
state relations. Norms governing private interactions were 
categorized as private international law. According to the positivist 
view, only agreements accepted by states could create binding 
international law norms. Individuals were relegated to a dependent 
status: to the extent that individuals had any rights under international 
law, those rights were by-products of the rights of states. Thus, 
foreign citizens might be entitled to some protection because 
violations of their rights were considered violations of the rights of 
their states of citizenship. The rights of religious minorities were 
protected as an extension of the rights of the states in which they 
constituted a majority. As summarized by Oppenheim, ―the Law of 
Nations is primarily a law between States,‖ and, as a result, states are 
―the only subjects of the Law of Nations.‖7 
Within this positivist framework, human rights law developed 
through agreements among states. In the late nineteenth century, 
states signed treaties in which they agreed to prohibit and punish 
conduct such as the slave trade
8
 or the mistreatment of injured and 
 
3. See MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 18–60 (2004).  
4. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *67. 
5. 4 id. at *67.  
6. Id. at *66. 
7. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 636 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 
1955).  
8. For a discussion of the gradual development of international rules barring slavery and 
the slave trade, see Roger S. Clark, Steven Spielberg’s Amistad and Other Things I Have 
Thought About in the Past Forty Years: International (Criminal) Law, Conflict of Laws, 
Insurance and Slavery, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 371, 393–410 (1999). 
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captured soldiers during armed conflict.
9
 These treaties were binding 
only on the states that ratified them. In general, they gave individuals 
no right to enforce rights or to seek compensation when injured by a 
violation. Instead, enforcement was either non-existent or left to 
states in their relationships with each other.  
During the decades following the atrocities of World War II, 
states dramatically expanded human rights commitments through a 
web of human rights treaties.
10
 In addition, as acceptance of human 
rights norms expanded, the prohibitions codified in many of these 
treaties developed into customary international law or jus cogens 
norms, binding on all states even without state consent. The 
Nuremberg Tribunal marked the beginning of this process when it 
recognized that the prohibition of crimes against humanity was 
binding on all states because it was ―recognized by all civilized 
nations‖ and ―regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs 
of wars.‖11 The tribunal applied the prohibition as a rule of customary 
international law, even though the underlying treaty only bound states 
that were party to it.
12
 
These universal human rights norms are ―extraterritorial‖ by 
definition. That is, they apply everywhere, across borders. Genocide, 
slavery, and torture are prohibited everywhere, without restrictions 
imposed by geography or state lines.
13
 It is important to pause for a 
 
9. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and 
Wounded of Armies in the Field (1864), 22 Stat. 940 (1865). 
10. For an overview of the development of international human rights norms after World 
War II, see Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International 
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 22 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 53, 64–75 (1981). 
11. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL 254 (1947). 
12. Id. at 253–54. The Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 
1907 stated that ―[t]he provisions [of this Convention] do not apply except between 
contracting Powers, and then only if all belligerents are parties to the Convention.‖ 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 2, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277, 2296, 1 Bevans 631, 644.  
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§-702 (1987) (―A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, 
encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade . . . [or] (d) torture.‖); see 
also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (stating that 
―genocide . . . is a crime under international law,‖ with no qualifications or exceptions); 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 2(2), Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 
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moment to consider the significance of this. When genocide or 
slavery or torture occurs in Nigeria or Colombia or the United States, 
a universal norm has been violated. International law prohibits this 
conduct everywhere. Specific treaties may have geographical 
limitations, but universal norms do not.  
B. 
The consequences of these universal prohibitions are more 
contested. What do the universal prohibitions of genocide, slavery, 
and torture signify in terms of implementation and enforcement? 
Does international law bind all states to prohibit conduct that violates 
universal norms as a matter of domestic law, hold perpetrators 
accountable, or provide redress to victims? Or is implementation—
including prohibition, punishment, and redress—left to each state? 
Several treaties obligate states to prohibit certain conduct as a 
matter of domestic law, extradite or prosecute those accused of such 
behavior, or deliver the accused to an international tribunal for 
prosecution.
14
 Some treaties also obligate states to provide redress to 
those harmed by human rights violations.
15
 Many scholars argue that 
customary international law has adopted additional obligations to 
redress violations of international law, binding on all states, not just 
those that explicitly ratify these treaties. In 2005, the General 
Assembly endorsed a general right to redress when it adopted a 
broad-ranging set of principles on the right to a remedy and 
reparation.
16
 The principles call on states to provide victims of human 
rights violations with access to justice and effective remedies, 
including reparation.
17
 The principles also call on states to prevent, 
investigate, and punish human rights violations.
18
  
 
[hereinafter Torture Convention] (―No exceptional circumstances whatsoever . . . may be 
invoked as a justification of torture.‖).  
14. See, e.g., Genocide Convention, supra note 13, art. 1 (stating that genocide ―is a 
crime‖ which states ―undertake to prevent or punish‖); Torture Convention, supra note 13, 
art. 5 (requiring that states prosecute or extradite torturers). 
15. See, e.g., Torture Convention, supra note 13, art. 14 (―Each State Party shall ensure 
in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable 
right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as 
possible.‖). 
16. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 
2005).  
17. Id. ¶¶ 11–23. 
18. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3(b), 4.   
12-Stephens 8/28/2013  9:27 PM 
260 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 28:256 
 
 
The ongoing struggle of the human rights movement and civil 
society more generally is to incorporate affirmative obligations into 
the international understanding of the human rights norms. It is not 
enough to prohibit certain conduct on paper; there must also be an 
obligation to prevent, investigate, punish, and provide redress.  
II. 
Corporations bear responsibility for human rights violations 
around the world.
19
 Corporate agents commit such violations directly, 
as when corporate security forces kill or injure people. Corporate 
actors also conspire in and finance violations committed by 
government officials. But victims of corporate human rights 
violations are hard-pressed to find a venue with the legal authority to 
hold a multinational corporation liable for its human rights violations. 
Corporations use multiple legal structures to insulate themselves from 
accountability. And multinational corporations have used their 
considerable economic might around the world to create protections 
for their own due process and substantive rights, while carefully 
blocking efforts to develop similar protections for those injured by 
their activities. 
A. 
The concepts of territoriality and extraterritoriality are 
meaningless when applied to modern corporations. Multinationals 
often choose the place of their incorporation—and, therefore, their 
nationality—because of the financial and legal implications, not due 
to their ties to their ―home‖ state. They set up subsidiaries, holding 
companies, and other entities based on the same logic. The result is a 
web of corporate structures explicitly designed to minimize 
accountability and liability for the impact of their operations, 
including accountability and liability for human rights violations. 
Within this web, territorial and extraterritorial have little meaning.  
Phillip Blumberg traced the origins of this liability-shifting 
structure to the early-twentieth-century decision to allow corporations 
 
19. For historical perspective on corporate human rights abuses, as well as modern 
examples, see Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and 
Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 45–47, 49–53 (2002). 
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to own stock in other corporations.
20
 Corporate shareholders were 
granted the same limited liability protection as individual 
shareholders, despite the shared business that linked the parent and 
subsidiary companies:
21
  
[This structure] overlooked the fact that the parent 
corporation and its subsidiaries were collectively 
conducting a common enterprise, that the business had 
been fragmented among the component companies of 
the group, and that limited liability – a doctrine 
designed to protect investors in an enterprise, not the 
enterprise itself – would be extended to protect each 
fragment of the business from liability for the 
obligations of all the other fragments.
22
 
A century later, the result is a legal structure that wrongly 
attributes legal independence to each component company and 
ignores the corporate group’s multiple, amorphous, and often 
artificial legal identities.
23
 As such, it is misleading to term regulation 
of the various pieces of the multinational corporation as 
extraterritorial merely because the parent company is based 
elsewhere. Determining the proper venue to sue a multinational 
corporation is a classic shell game. 
The facts underlying the Kiobel case decided by the Supreme 
Court in April 2013 provide one example. Although personal 
jurisdiction was not litigated in Kiobel,
24
 the facts are similar to those 
in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
25
 which was filed six years 
earlier and settled in 2009. The Wiwa complaint was based in part on 
 
20. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE 
SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 56–59 (1993). 
21. Id. at 58–59.  
22. Id. at 59. 
23. As Blumberg explained: 
These very large corporations typically operate as multi-tiered multinational groups 
of parent and subsidiary corporations collectively conducting worldwide 
economically integrated enterprises that for legal or political purposes have been 
fragmented among the constituent companies of the group.  
Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 283, 298 (1990). 
24. In the Kiobel case, defendants failed to challenge personal jurisdiction in their 
Rule 12 motion to dismiss, thereby waiving the challenge and, in effect, consenting to 
personal jurisdiction. They also failed to file a forum non conveniens motion; it is not clear 
whether the federal courts would consider such a motion timely if it were filed after the case 
is remanded to the district court. 
25. 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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actions of the global Shell/Royal Dutch Petroleum multinational 
enterprise, and also on actions of its Nigerian subsidiary, Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. (SPDC).
26
 Profits 
from the Nigerian operation flow up the chain to the parent 
corporation, although it would take a forensic accounting team to 
unravel where those profits end up (and where taxes on those profits 
should be paid).
27
 Although Shell Oil Company, the U.S. subsidiary, 
does billions of dollars of business in the United States, those U.S. 
ties were not attributed to Royal Dutch Petroleum, the parent 
company, for the purposes of personal jurisdiction.
28
 Instead, 
personal jurisdiction was based on a handful of direct ties between 
Royal Dutch Petroleum and New York State.
29
 According to 
corporate-friendly rules, Shell U.S.A. is a separate entity from the 
others, and litigation against Royal Dutch Petroleum in the United 
States for events that occurred in Nigeria is ―extraterritorial.‖ But that 
conclusion merely reflects Royal Dutch Petroleum’s artificial (but 
perfectly legal) business decisions, made precisely to insulate its 
various divisions from the legal obligations incurred by other 
divisions. 
In another infamous example, after the Union Carbide disaster in 
Bhopal, India, a 1984 chemical leak that killed thousands of people 
and injured tens of thousands more, representatives of the victims of 
the leak argued that the Union Carbide should be viewed as a single 
legal entity, rather than as independent parts: 
In reality there is but one entity, the monolithic 
multinational, which is responsible for the design 
development and dissemination of information and 
technology worldwide, acting through a neatly 
designed network of interlocking directors, common 
operating systems, global distribution and marketing 
systems, financial and other controls. . . . Persons 
harmed by the acts of [a] multinational corporation are 
[not] in a position to isolate which unit of the 
enterprise caused the harm, yet it is evident that the 
 
26. Id. at 92.   
27. See id. (describing Shell/Royal Dutch Petroleum Company as a ―vertically integrated 
network of affiliated but formally independent oil and gas companies‖).  
28. See id. at 93.   
29. Id. at 94–99. The court did not consider plaintiffs’ argument that Shell U.S.A. was 
the alter ego of Royal Dutch Petroleum. Id. at 95 n.4. 
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multinational enterprise that caused the harm is liable 
for such harm. The defendant multinational 
corporation has to bear this responsibility for it alone 
had at all material times the means to know and guard 
against hazards likely to be caused by the operation of 
the said plant, designed and installed or caused to be 
installed by it and to provide warnings of potential 
hazards.
30
 
U.S. courts rejected this approach, dismissing the case on the basis of 
forum non conveniens after concluding that there was insufficient 
connection between the U.S. parent company and the Indian 
operation to justify suit in U.S. courts.
31
 
On rare occasions, the shell game turns around and bites the 
corporation (to mix a metaphor). In 1993, Ecuadorans sued Texaco 
Oil in a U.S. federal court, seeking damages for environmental harms 
in Ecuador.
32
 Texaco, a U.S. corporation, argued successfully that the 
lawsuit should be litigated in Ecuador, and the U.S. claim was 
dismissed in 2002 on the condition that Texaco submit to the 
jurisdiction of the courts in Ecuador.
33
 In 2011, the Ecuadoran courts 
issued a final, enforceable judgment against Chevron Corporation—
which had merged with Texaco in 2001—for nineteen billion dollars. 
Texaco’s response to the Ecuadoran judgment has been nothing short 
of scorched earth. The company has employed hundreds of lawyers 
and dozens of law firms to file racketeering claims against all those 
involved in Ecuador litigation, and it has used an international 
arbitration procedure to block the government from enforcing the 
 
30. Jamie Cassels, Outlaws: Multinational Corporations and Catastrophic Law, 31 
CUMB. L. REV. 311, 324 (2000) (second alternation in original) (quoting Complaint ¶ 19, 
Union of India v. Union Carbide Corp., (Sept. 5, 1986) (India)). To view a reprint of the full 
complaint, see UPENDRA BAXI & AMITA DHANDA, VALIANT VICTIMS AND LETHAL 
LITIGATION: THE BHOPAL CASE 3–12 (1990).  
31. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 809 
F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal). 
32. For an overview of this litigation, see Suraj Patel, Delayed Justice: A Case Study of 
Texaco and the Republic of Ecuador's Operations, Harms, and Possible Redress in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 71 (2012). For diametrically opposed views of the 
underlying issues, compare the material posted at About the Campaign, CHEVRON TOXICO: 
THE CAMPAIGN FOR JUSTICE IN ECUADOR, http://chevrontoxico.com/about/ (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2013) with Ecuador Lawsuit, CHEVRON, http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/ (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2013).   
33. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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judgment.
34
  
The lesson to other multinational corporations may be to think 
carefully before deciding that a forum in the host state will prove 
favorable. But, as discussed in the following section, Chevron’s use 
of international arbitration reflects a growing movement away from 
the courts to a forum even more reliably tilted in favor of corporate 
interests. 
B. 
Corporations appear to be increasingly wary of the dangers they 
face in litigation in the courts of the states in which they do business. 
As a result, they have sought to institutionalize the right to raise 
claims against the governments of those host states through 
arbitration. Regional trade agreements and thousands of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) permit corporations that invest in ―foreign‖ 
states to challenge state actions before arbitration panels and to 
enforce any resulting damage award in local courts.
35
 The treaties 
guarantee fair treatment, contract enforcement, protection against 
expropriation, and compensation for violations of other rights. They 
also provide access to a neutral arbitration proceeding and a 
guarantee that any judgment will be enforceable.   
These arbitration agreements are one-sided in the sense that they 
provide protections for the foreign investor but do not impose any 
reciprocal obligations on the investor. Corporations have opposed 
efforts to codify corporate obligations through multilateral or bilateral 
treaties. Moreover, victims of corporate misbehavior have no neutral 
forum in which to vindicate their rights. 
 
34. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 783 F. Supp. 2d 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Patel, 
supra note 32, at 97–98 (describing Chevron’s attempt to quash the Ecuadorian ruling 
through an international court of arbitration).   
35. For an overview, see Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 
61 DUKE L.J. 775, 831–41 (2012) (discussing bilateral and regional investment agreements 
and international investment arbitration mechanisms). For discussions of the potential for 
conflict between the protections that these agreements afford to corporations and the rights 
of natural persons, see Marc Jacob, International Investment Agreements and Human Rights 
26–31 (Inst. Dev. & Peace Research Paper Series, Mar. 2010), available at 
http://www.humanrightsbusiness.org/files/international_investment_agreements_and_human 
rights.pdf, and LUKE ERIC PETERSON, RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 27–31 (2009), available at http://publications.gc.ca/ 
collections/collection_2012/dd-rd/E84-36-2009-eng.pdf. 
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C. 
Multinational corporations have succeeded in imposing an 
international legal system that is heavily weighted in their favor. 
International law respects domestic law definitions of the corporate 
structure, which permit international enterprises to incorporate as 
multiple legally separate entities that, as a general rule, are not 
considered to be responsible for each other’s debts and obligations, 
including compensation for injuries they inflict. And international 
law contains thousands of treaties granting corporations the right to 
seek arbitration when their rights are allegedly violated in a country 
in which they are considered to be a foreign corporation. Finally, 
corporations have resisted efforts to codify their international law 
obligations, or to create a neutral forum in which they would be 
required to respond to claims that they have caused damage in the 
places where they do business.  
As a result, multinationals have a host of mechanisms to avoid 
legal accountability. When sued in the place where they do business, 
they claim that the harms were inflicted by a local subsidiary, not by 
the parent company, and that the subsidiary has insufficient assets to 
pay for the injuries. If forced to litigate in the host country, they 
argue that the courts of that state are corrupt or biased against them or 
otherwise incompetent to hear the claim.
36
 When corporations are 
sued in their own home country or in the courts of a third country, 
they argue that they are the wrong defendant and are not responsible 
for the subsidiaries’ actions or that the courts of that state have no 
right to hear claims occurring outside their territory.
37
   
Complaints about the extraterritorial application of the ATS 
must be understood in this context. In the United States, the ATS has 
filled a small part of the enforcement gap, permitting a small number 
of those injured by corporate human rights abuses to file suits in U.S. 
courts if they can assert personal jurisdiction over the corporate 
defendant. Many of the cases have been filed against U.S. 
corporations and are not, therefore, extraterritorial. All those filed 
against foreign corporations involve companies with a presence in the 
 
36. Cf. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 2012) (describing 
Chevron’s arguments that a judgment rendered against it by Ecuadorian courts should not be 
enforceable on the basis that Ecuadoran judiciary was tainted by political interests). 
37. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 
1984, 809 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1987) (―UCC moved to dismiss the complaints on grounds 
of forum non conveniens, the plaintiffs’ lack of standing to bring the actions in the United 
States . . . .‖). 
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United States sufficient both to establish personal jurisdiction and to 
survive a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. In its April 
2013 decision in Kiobel, however, the Supreme Court narrowed the 
application of the ATS, as discussed in the following section. 
III. 
For over two decades, ATS jurisprudence assumed without 
discussion that the statute applied to conduct outside the United 
States. Most important, in its 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, the Supreme Court decided an ATS case involving events 
that took place in Mexico.
38
 The Court rejected application of the 
statute to the facts of that case,
39
 and much of the discussion and 
reasoning of the opinion is based on the assumption that the statute 
primarily concerns claims arising in the territory of foreign states.
40
 
The Court also declined to even address the Executive Branch’s 
arguments about extraterritoriality.
41
 In subsequent cases, a handful 
of dissenting opinions discussed the issue,
42
 but the extraterritorial 
application of the statute remained relatively noncontroversial until 
the Supreme Court ordered the Kiobel litigants to brief and argue the 
following issue: ―Whether and under what circumstances the [ATS] 
allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law 
of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the 
United States.‖43 
 
38. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
39. Id. at 738 (holding that a detention of less than a day, followed by transfer to lawful 
custody, did not violate an international norm sufficient to support a federal common law 
claim under the ATS).  
40. The majority, for example, discussed the possibility of imposing a requirement of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies, id. at 733 n.21, a procedure that would be unnecessary 
unless the acts giving rise to the claim arose in the territory of a foreign state. The Court also 
discussed at some length the potential foreign policy concerns triggered by ATS cases, a 
concern that is not present in cases that do not involve foreign states. Id. at 727–28. 
41. See Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 46–50, Sosa, 
542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339) (arguing that federal courts cannot recognize ATS claims based 
on conduct occurring in the territory of foreign states). 
42. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 74–81 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
43. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.). The Supreme 
Court originally granted review in Kiobel to consider whether the ATS applies at all to 
corporate defendants, but, after oral argument on that issue, the Court ordered reargument on 
the issue of extraterritoriality. Id. Although the opinion did not directly address the 
corporate-defendant issue, the fact that the Court acknowledged the possibility that a claim 
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In the April 2013 Kiobel decision, Chief Justice Roberts, writing 
for a five-Justice majority, acknowledged that the standard statutory 
presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply to the ATS, 
because the presumption applies to statutes that regulate conduct 
abroad.
44
 The ATS, by contrast, provides jurisdiction; federal 
common law provides the cause of action, based on clearly defined, 
widely accepted international law norms.
45
 The Kiobel majority 
relied instead on the ―principles underlying the presumption of 
extraterritoriality,‖46 because of ―the danger of unwarranted judicial 
interference in the conduct of foreign policy.‖47 
The Court then rejected the argument that the text, history, and 
purposes of the ATS rebut this new presumption, a result with which 
I strongly disagree. But the majority opinion concluded by 
recognizing the possibility that an ATS case with sufficient ties to the 
United States might ―displace‖ the presumption. In this section, I first 
discuss my objections to the Court’s conclusion that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applies to the ATS, then discuss the 
relatively narrow holding of the case and consider what claims are 
likely to be actionable after Kiobel. 
A. 
In Kiobel, the Court imposed a twenty-first-century standard of 
interpretation—requiring a clear indication that Congress intended 
the courts to recognize extraterritorial common law claims—on an 
eighteenth-century statute, and ignored the common sense reading of 
the text of the ATS, contemporary understanding of its reach, prior 
judicial interpretations, and the congressional response to the 
application of the statute to extraterritorial acts.   
Statutory text: The text of the ATS grants federal courts 
jurisdiction over claims for ―a tort only, committed in violation of the 
 
might have sufficient ties to the United States to ―displace‖ the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, see infra Part III.B, suggests that the ATS can apply to corporate 
defendants. Moreover, the Second Circuit held that it did not have ATS subject matter 
jurisdiction over a claim against a corporate defendant, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), an argument that the 
Supreme Court presumably rejected since it did not dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  
44. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.  
45. Id. (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713). 
46. Id. at 1665.  
47. Id. at 1664. The majority in effect creates a new presumption, the Kiobel 
presumption, applicable to the common law cause of action created in ATS cases. See id. at 
1664–65. 
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law of nations . . . .‖48 This text includes no limits on the location of 
the torts that trigger federal jurisdiction. Other provisions of the same 
section of the First Judiciary Act did include territorial limitations,
49
 
indicating that the Congress that enacted the ATS had thought about 
such restrictions, knew how to include them, and chose not to so limit 
the ATS. 
The Court in Kiobel noted that the statute uses the term ―tort,‖ 
and that, at the time the statute was enacted (and today as well), 
transitory torts could be litigated in U.S. courts no matter where the 
claims arose.
50
 The Supreme Court relied on the common law 
understanding of transitory torts in Burnham v. Superior Court of 
California,
51
 quoting Justice Story’s observation that ―by the 
common law[,] personal actions, being transitory, may be brought in 
any place, where the party defendant may be found.‖52 The use of 
―tort‖ in the ATS thus provides strong evidence that the eighteenth-
century Congress intended the statute to apply to transitory torts that 
constituted violations of the law of nations. 
Contemporary understanding: A 1795 opinion of Attorney 
General William Bradford, issued just a few years after the ATS was 
enacted, concluded that the ATS applied to a claim arising in the 
territory of Sierra Leone, a sovereign state.
53
 Bradford noted that the 
criminal prosecution of those involved in the violation of the law of 
nations would not be possible, but then stated: 
[T]here can be no doubt that the company or individuals who 
have been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by 
 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The ATS was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73.  
49. See Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9, 1 Stat. 73, at 76–77 (granting the district courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes ―committed within their respective districts, or upon the 
high seas,‖ and over certain seizures made ―on waters which are navigable from the sea by 
vessels of ten or more tons burthen‖ or ―within their respective districts as well as upon the 
high seas‖). 
50. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665–66.  
51. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
52. Id. at 611 (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 554, 543 
(1846)).  
53. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1795). For an extensive discussion of 
the Bradford opinion, including contemporaneous documents confirming that Bradford knew 
that the events had occurred in the territory of a foreign state, see Supplemental Brief of 
Amici Curiae Professors of Legal History et al. in Support of Petitioners at 18–25, Kiobel, 
133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
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a civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction 
being expressly given to these courts in all cases where an 
alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or 
a treaty of the United States . . . .
54
 
The Court discredits this source as insufficient to counter the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.
55
 But the Bradford opinion 
shows that, just six years after Congress enacted the ATS, the leading 
lawyer in the U.S. government thought that it applied to conduct 
within the territory of a foreign state. Surely, this evidence is crucial 
to the interpretation of a statute enacted over 200 years ago, and 
stronger evidence of the intent of the first Congress than the strict 
version of the presumption against extraterritoriality recently adopted 
by a modern Supreme Court. 
Modern judicial interpretation: The Supreme Court has 
considered the meaning of the ATS in multiple cases, each involving 
extraterritorial torts. None of those cases even hint that the location of 
the underlying events might be relevant to the application of the 
statute.
56
 In addition, in the 2004 decision in Sosa, the Court cited the 
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala decision with approval.
57
 Since Filártiga 
involved torture in Paraguay,
58
 it clearly relied on extraterritorial 
application of the ATS. The Kiobel majority made no effort to 
explain the apparent acceptance of extraterritorial application of the 
ATS in the Court’s own decisions. 
 
54. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. at 59. 
55. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667–68. 
56. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (holding that the defendant was not 
entitled to statutory immunity, without questioning the application of the ATS to the facts, in 
an ATS case involving human rights abuses in Somalia); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 
692, 732 (2004) (holding, in a case involving events in Mexico, that the claim did not state a 
cause of action, without questioning whether the statute would apply to a properly stated 
claim, and citing with approval cases applying the statute to events that took place in foreign 
states); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 436 (1989) 
(discussing the ATS and assuming that it would have applied if not for the immunity granted 
to the defendant, a sovereign state, in a case involving an attack on a tanker on the high 
seas); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964) (citing the ATS 
as one of several constitutional and statutory provisions ―reflecting a concern for uniformity 
in this country's dealings with foreign nations and indicating a desire to give matters of 
international significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions,‖ in a case involving 
expropriation in Cuba). 
57. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (noting that Sosa’s holding was ―generally consistent with the 
reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it reached this Court,‖ 
and citing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980), as one example of this 
consistency). 
58. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
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Congressional response: The Second Circuit decided Filártiga 
in 1980, over three decades ago. Since that time, Congress has 
expressed support for the Filártiga interpretation of the statute,
59
 and 
has made no effort to narrow the reach of the ATS by excluding 
jurisdiction over acts occurring within the territory of foreign states. 
To the contrary, Congress expanded human rights claims in three 
separate statutes: the Torture Victim Protection Act,
60
 the Anti-
Terrorism Act,
61
 and the ―state sponsors of terrorism‖ exception to 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
62
 Each statute further extends 
the right to bring civil claims for human rights violations; each 
applies to acts occurring in the territory of foreign states; and none 
purports to replace or narrow the scope of the ATS. As the Supreme 
Court emphasized in Sosa, ―Congress . . . has not only expressed no 
disagreement with our view of the proper exercise of the judicial 
power, but has responded . . . by enacting legislation supplementing 
the judicial determination in some detail.‖63  
Finally, to the extent that litigation in U.S. courts of human 
rights claims arising out of events in foreign states triggers concerns 
about fairness to the defendants, foreign policy, or inconvenience, 
those problems are properly addressed through one or more standard 
federal court doctrines: personal jurisdiction, political question or act 
of state, and forum non conveniens.
64
 Human rights claims are not 
more complex or politically sensitive than dozens of other cases 
routinely decided by federal courts. When ATS cases have 
insufficient ties to the United States, trespass upon the foreign affairs 
powers of the Executive Branch, or require that a court judge the 
 
59. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3–4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 
(stating that the ATS has ―important uses and should not be replaced,‖ and noting that the 
Filártiga decision has ―met with general approval‖).  
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006) (authorizing U.S. citizens, as well as noncitizens, to 
sue for torture and extrajudicial execution). 
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006) (authorizing a U.S. national ―injured in his or her person, 
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism‖ to sue for treble 
damages). 
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (Supp. V 2011) (permitting suits for extrajudicial killing, torture, 
and other abuses against states labeled ―sponsor[s] of terrorism‖ by the U.S. Department of 
State).  
63. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note). 
64. For a full discussion of the application of these doctrines to extraterritorial ATS 
claims, see Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure and Federal Courts as Amici Curiae on 
Reargument in Support of Petitioners at 1–30, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. 
Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).  
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legitimate acts of a sovereign state, the courts have applied these pre-
existing doctrines and have dismissed the claims. There is nothing 
unique about ATS claims that requires application of novel, contorted 
rules of statutory interpretation. 
B. 
The Kiobel decision was clear on a few important points, while 
leaving many others unresolved. Most clearly, the Court unanimously 
rejected application of the ATS to the claims at issue in that case: 
foreign plaintiffs, suing a foreign corporation with a minimal 
presence in the United States, for events that took place entirely 
outside the United States.
65
 The five-Justice majority reached that 
result after concluding that the principles underlying the presumption 
against extraterritoriality ―constrain courts exercising their power 
under the ATS.‖66 The majority emphasized that application of the 
ATS to events arising in the territory of foreign states posed ―the 
danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign 
policy.‖67  
The opinion also left clear, however, that, in some 
circumstances, a claim might have sufficient ties with the United 
States to ―displace‖ the Kiobel presumption.68 The concluding 
language narrowly limited the holding to the facts of this case:  
On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place 
outside the United States. And even where the claims 
touch and concern the territory of the United States, 
they must do so with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application. 
Corporations are often present in many countries, and 
it would reach too far to say that mere corporate 
presence suffices. If Congress were to determine 
otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would 
be required.
69
 
Thus, where claims ―touch and concern the territory of the United 
States . . . with sufficient force,‖ they will ―displace the presumption 
against extraterritorial application,‖ even if they arise outside of the 
 
65. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.  
66. Id. at 1665. 
67. Id. at 1664. 
68. Id. at 1669. 
69. Id. (citation omitted).  
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United States.
70
  
Concurring opinions on behalf of three of the Justices in the 
majority emphasized that the majority opinion did not address all 
claims arising outside the United States. Justice Kennedy noted that 
―[t]he opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a number of 
significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the 
Alien Tort Statute,‖ and observed that, in his view, ―that is a proper 
disposition.‖71 He concluded that in cases ―with allegations of serious 
violations of international law principles‖ that are not covered by the 
―reasoning and holding‖ of Kiobel, ―the proper implementation of the 
presumption against extraterritorial application may require some 
further elaboration and explanation.‖72  
Justices Alito and Thomas would have preferred that the 
majority opinion went further. They argued that ―a putative ATS 
cause of action will fall within the scope of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality—and will therefore be barred—unless the domestic 
conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies 
Sosa’s requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized 
nations.‖73 But their view that only human-rights-violating conduct 
within U.S. territory is sufficient to support an ATS claim obtained 
only two votes from the Court, and they acknowledged that the 
Court’s conclusion takes a ―narrow approach‖ that ―leaves much 
unanswered.‖74   
These two concurring opinions, joined by three members of the 
 
70. Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883–88 (2010)).  
71. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
72. Id. If Kiobel had definitively barred all claims arising outside of the United States, 
there would be no need for ―further elaboration and explanation‖ of the ―proper 
implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application‖ of the ATS.  
73. Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring). 
74. Id. at 1669–70. Justice Breyer’s separate concurring opinion for four Justices also 
recognizes that the majority opinion ―offers only limited help in deciding‖ what cases fall 
within the reach of the ATS. Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
The majority echoes in this jurisdictional context Sosa’s warning to use 
―caution‖ in shaping federal common-law causes of action. But it also makes 
clear that a statutory claim might sometimes ―touch and concern the territory 
of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption.‖ It 
leaves for another day the determination of just when the presumption 
against extraterritoriality might be ―overcome.‖  
Id. (citations omitted). Seven of the Justices thus stated explicitly that the majority 
opinion leaves many issues undecided.  
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five-Justice majority, clarify that Kiobel did not address claims that 
have a greater connection to U.S. territory than those at issue in the 
Kiobel case.  
C. 
What categories of post-Kiobel claims will have sufficient ties to 
the United States to ―displace‖ the presumption against 
extraterritoriality? The final paragraph of the majority opinion 
offered some clues. First, the majority concluded that the ATS would 
not support claims against a defendant with a ―mere corporate 
presence‖ in the United States, given that a corporation can be 
―present in many countries.‖75 The corporate defendants in Kiobel 
were Dutch, British, and Nigerian citizens, with minimal ties to the 
United States.
76
 By contrast, a U.S. citizen corporation has a 
substantial presence in the United States and connections to this 
country that are qualitatively different from ―mere corporate 
presence.‖ Second, Kiobel does not preclude claims against 
individual defendants, who can, of course, be physically present in 
only one country. As a result, it seems likely that U.S. citizens, both 
corporate and individual, and non-citizen individuals living in the 
United States will have sufficient contacts with the United States to 
overcome the Kiobel presumption. Finally, the language of the 
concluding paragraph suggests that some claims involving conduct in 
the United States will ―touch and concern‖ the United States with 
sufficient force to justify judicial recognition of a cause of action.  
The policy reasons underlying the Court’s adoption of the Kiobel 
presumption also support the view that claims against U.S. citizens, 
both corporate and individual, and against individuals living in the 
United States will continue to be actionable under the ATS. The 
majority rested much of its analysis of the ATS on concerns about the 
foreign policy consequences of such litigation.
77
 Holding U.S. 
citizens accountable for violations of international law, no matter 
where committed, would not have a negative impact on foreign 
affairs. Similarly, denying safe haven to non-citizens who have 
relocated to the United States is consistent with U.S. foreign policy 
interests. As the Department of Justice wrote in an amicus curiae 
brief in Kiobel, recognizing a cause of action against an alleged 
perpetrator who is living in the United States ―is consistent with the 
 
75. Id. at 1669 (majority opinion). 
76. Id. at 1662. 
77. See, e.g., id. at 1664, 1669. 
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foreign relations interests of the United States, including the 
promotion of respect for human rights.‖78 
The Supreme Court’s narrow holding left room to debate these 
issues, and commentators and litigators analyzing Kiobel already 
disagree about many aspects of the decision. Most agree on one 
point, however: the scope of the ATS will now be fought (again) in 
every pending case, and, in the likely event that the lower courts do 
not reach a consensus, will probably reach the Supreme Court (yet 
again).  
* * * * * 
ATS human rights litigation represents a modest opportunity for 
a small number of victims and survivors of gross human rights abuses 
to seek a modicum of justice. The corporate campaign against such 
litigation should be recognized as yet another effort by multinational 
corporations to resist efforts to level the playing field of international 
justice. The Supreme Court’s narrow holding in Kiobel should not 
bar claims against U.S. corporations or claims against foreign 
corporations with substantial ties to the United States. 
 
78. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of 
Affirmance at 13, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491). 
